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CurrentBEST CURRENT PRACTICEIETF streamBCP185

RFC 9319: The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

In plain English — editorial summary, not part of the RFC

This document recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin hijack attack surface by prudently limiting the set of IP prefixes that are included in a Route Origin Authorization (ROA). One recommendation is to avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases. The recommendations complement and extend those in RFC 7115. This document also discusses the creation of ROAs for facilitating the use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation services. Considerations related to ROAs and RPKI-based Route Origin Validation (RPKI-ROV) in the context of destination-based Remotely Triggered Discard Route (RTDR) (elsewhere referred to as "Remotely Triggered Black Hole") filtering are also highlighted.

Document record

Document ID
RFC9319
Published
October 2022
Authors
Y. Gilad; S. Goldberg; K. Sriram; J. Snijders; B. Maddison
Status
BEST CURRENT PRACTICE
Stream
IETF
Area
ops
Pages
13
Also known as
BCP185

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The document record above — title, authors, date, status, stream, area, relationships, DOI and errata — is imported verbatim from the public RFC Editor index. The “in plain English” section is editorial: written by The metasystema editorial team, not part of the RFC. Where the two differ, the RFC text governs.

Last checked against the RFC Editor index on . RFCs are never revised after publication; changes are issued as new documents.

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canonical URL: /rfc/9319-the-use-of-maxlength-in-the-resource-public-key-infrastructure-rpki