RFC 4270: Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols

In plain English — editorial summary, not part of the RFC

Recent announcements of better-than-expected collision attacks in popular hash algorithms have caused some people to question whether common Internet protocols need to be changed, and if so, how. This document summarizes the use of hashes in many protocols, discusses how the collision attacks affect and do not affect the protocols, shows how to thwart known attacks on digital certificates, and discusses future directions for protocol designers. This memo provides information for the Internet community.

Document record

Document ID

RFC4270

Published

December 2005

Authors

P. Hoffman; B. Schneier

Status

INFORMATIONAL

Stream

IETF

Area

—

Pages

12

Also known as

—

• Read the full RFC text →
• Plain text version
• IETF Datatracker history
• DOI: 10.17487/RFC4270
• Reported errata exist →

Topics

• collision attacks
• hash algorithms
• ip
• digital certificates

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Also filed under

• INFORMATIONAL
• 2005
• IETF stream