CurrentPROPOSED STANDARDIETF stream

RFC 8750: Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

In plain English — editorial summary, not part of the RFC

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) sends an initialization vector (IV) in each packet. The size of the IV depends on the applied transform and is usually 8 or 16 octets for the transforms defined at the time this document was written. When used with IPsec, some algorithms, such as AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305, take the IV to generate a nonce that is used as an input parameter for encrypting and decrypting. This IV must be unique but can be predictable. As a result, the value provided in the ESP Sequence Number (SN) can be used instead to generate the nonce. This avoids sending the IV itself and saves 8 octets per packet in the case of AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305. This document describes how to do this.

Document record

Document ID
RFC8750
Published
March 2020
Authors
D. Migault; T. Guggemos; Y. Nir
Status
PROPOSED STANDARD
Stream
IETF
Area
sec
Pages
8
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canonical URL: /rfc/8750-implicit-initialization-vector-iv-for-counter-based-ciphers-in-encapsulating-sec