RFC 6962: Certificate Transparency
This RFC has been replaced. Do not implement against it for new work — it was formally obsoleted by RFC 9162.
Current version: RFC 9162 — Certificate Transparency Version 2.0
In plain English — editorial summary, not part of the RFC
This document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs. Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document.
Document record
- Document ID
- RFC6962
- Published
- June 2013
- Authors
- B. Laurie; A. Langley; E. Kasper
- Status
- EXPERIMENTAL
- Stream
- IETF
- Area
- —
- Pages
- 27
- Also known as
- —
- Obsoleted by:
- RFC 9162
Topics
Referenced by
One later RFC formally updates or obsoletes part of this document.
Also filed under
About this page
The document record above — title, authors, date, status, stream, area, relationships, DOI and errata — is imported verbatim from the public RFC Editor index. The “in plain English” section is editorial: written by The metasystema editorial team, not part of the RFC. Where the two differ, the RFC text governs.
Last checked against the RFC Editor index on . RFCs are never revised after publication; changes are issued as new documents.
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