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RFC 5452: Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers

In plain English — editorial summary, not part of the RFC

The current Internet climate poses serious threats to the Domain Name System. In the interim period before the DNS protocol can be secured more fully, measures can already be taken to harden the DNS to make 'spoofing' a recursing nameserver many orders of magnitude harder. Even a cryptographically secured DNS benefits from having the ability to discard bogus responses quickly, as this potentially saves large amounts of computation. By describing certain behavior that has previously not been standardized, this document sets out how to make the DNS more resilient against accepting incorrect responses. This document updates RFC 2181. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Document record

Document ID
RFC5452
Published
January 2009
Authors
A. Hubert; R. van Mook
Status
PROPOSED STANDARD
Stream
IETF
Area
int
Pages
18
Also known as
—
Updates:
RFC 2181

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The document record above — title, authors, date, status, stream, area, relationships, DOI and errata — is imported verbatim from the public RFC Editor index. The “in plain English” section is editorial: written by The metasystema editorial team, not part of the RFC. Where the two differ, the RFC text governs.

Last checked against the RFC Editor index on . RFCs are never revised after publication; changes are issued as new documents.

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canonical URL: /rfc/5452-measures-for-making-dns-more-resilient-against-forged-answers